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Going Private-Is It Over?
Eliminating Minority Interests
After Singer v. Magnavox
Much has been written in recent years of the increasingly popular move by
corporate majorities to eliminate their minority counterparts from equity partici-
pation in a public corporation.' Frequently motivated by a desire to "go private,"
the majority shareholders have relied on various statutorily designed vehicles to
reacquire minority interests and thus achieve sole ownership of the corporation.
Such concentration of the ownership allows the corporation to return to a private
status, therefore avoiding the regulatory and disclosure requirements imposed
on public corporations by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 2
Despite the alleged inequities of eliminating minority interests, legislatively
designed mergers facilitate a return to private status. Recent decisions by the
Delaware courts, however, have caused concern in the corporate community as
to the future of such transactions.
In late 1977, the Delaware Supreme Court, the final arbiter of perhaps the
most significant American corporate case law, decided Singer v. Magnavox Co.'
In Singer, the court imposed strict fiduciary duties upon the majority stockholders
in merger transactions designed solely to eliminate the minority. Later that same
year, the Delaware court again ruled, in Tanzer v. International General In-
dustries, Inc.,' that the "entire fairness" of mergers designed to eliminate minority
interests would be subjected to increased judicial scrutiny.
Viewed against the background of prior Delaware case law, these decisions
indicate a shift in the attitude of the Delaware courts toward going private trans-
actions and the likelihood of increased difficulty and cost to corporations wishing
to return to a private status. For the thousands of the nation's leading companies
incorporated in Delaware, the shift in the attitude of the Delaware courts is of
direct concern. Since Delaware law has traditionally been the benchmark for
other state courts in determining the limitations of the maximum flexibility
allowed corporate management, the new cases are of broad concern to the
corporate bar.
I. Corporate and Insider Objectives in Going Private
A corporation may have several objectives in returning to private status.
The primary objective is to eliminate a sufficient number of shareholders to
enable the corporation to remove its shares from registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated by section 12 of the 1934 Act.5
1 Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987
(1974); Brudney, A Note on Going Private, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1019 (1975). See, e.g., Note,
Going Private, 84 YALE L. J. 903 (1975). See also Lynch, A Concern for the Interest of
Minority Shareholders Under Modern Corporation Laws, 3 J. oF CORP. L. 19 (1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
3 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
4 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1976). SEC de-registration has to be considered the primary goal
of any going private transaction since most companies do not find the supervision of the vari-
ous exchanges as burdensome as that of the SEC regulations. See 84 YALE L.J., supra note 1,
at 904 n. 7.
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A public corporation may de-register its stock when the total number of share-
holders is reduced to less than three hundred persons.6 De-registration affords
the corporation the savings in cost otherwise involved in sending proxy state-
ments and annual reports to its public shareholders in conformity with the
rigourous disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.
An ancillary benefit in returning to private status through the elimination
of the minority interests is the reduction in the number of shareholders thus
increasing the company's book value per share. Although book value is not gen-
erally considered a particularly accurate index of a company's worth, it has
added significance to a corporation which has gone private. Because its shares
are no longer listed on the national securities exchange where the once-public
company's shares were traded, the corporation is no longer tied to the exchange
for determining the value of its stock. For lack of a readily available measure of
value, the corporation's book value assumes a greater role in valuing the remain-
ing stock of the company. The increase in book value, together with the added
significance of that index, benefits the company in acquisitions or in granting
stock options as a medium of compensation or currency.
A significant advantage in returning to private status is that which accrues
to the corporate insiders, i.e., controlling shareholders. The insiders stand to
benefit from concentration of the management among the controlling share-
holders and the concomitant ability to handle corporate affairs so as to divert re-
wards to themselves rather than filtering them through the corporation. By re-
moving all of the corporation's stock from the public markets, closely held com-
panies are also protected from the threat of takeover offers. This results in
absolute investment protection for the controlling shareholders-a protection
that was not afforded the small minority investor who had hoped to retain his
investment in anticipation of a rebounding market.
The attainment of these benefits at the cost of eliminating the minority
shareholders raises strong countervailing policy arguments. There is strong re-
sentment of those companies that took advantage of the burgeoning stock market
of the late sixties and early seventies to gain needed capital by soliciting public
shareholders only to dispense with those shareholders at bargain prices as the
market subsequently declined. Many commentators have expressed concern that
continuation of the going private trend will seriously impair public confidence
in securities markets and American corporations.'
The Delaware Supreme Court responded, in part, to these concerns with its
decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co. The policy issues which question the un-
bridled elimination of minority interests will become increasingly significant as
the courts place greater emphasis on the law governing the majority shareholders'
6 15 U.S.C. § 78(1)(g)(4) (1976).
7 Former SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., one of the most outspoken critics on
the issue stated: "What is happening is, in my estimation, serious, unfair, and sometimes
disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing, and a course that inevitably
is going to make the individual shareholder even more hostile to American corporate mores and
the securities markets than he already is." Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private: A
Lesson in Corporate Responsibility," Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law




fiduciary responsibility in going private transactions.
II. The Mechanics of Going Private
Although other techniques for going private are sometimes used,' the most
common method is the squeeze-out merger. Such mergers are designed to merge
the target company with another company controlled by the majority share-
holders of the target. The traditional procedure for assimilating shareholders of
the target is to convert shares of the target into shares of the surviving corpora-
tion. In the squeeze-out mergers, however, the conversion medium is either
cash or non-equity securities of the surviving corporation. As a result, the
minority interests sought to be eliminated are either cashed-out or reduced to the
status of non-participating shareholders.
The successful completion of the squeeze-out merger is predicated on the
acquisition of a sufficient number of shares of the target company so that the
acquiring group can vote approval of the merger. If the acquiring group already
owns a majority interest in the company it seeks to make private, the procedure
is simplified. A one-step acquisition of the publicly held shares can be ac-
complished with the formation of a shell corporation by the majority as the
parent of the target and merging the target into the shell. If the acquiring group
does not own a sufficient number of shares of the target to approve the merger
unilaterally, the group must precede the merger with a tender offer in an attempt
to acquire a controlling interest.' The merger then serves as a "mop-up" tech-
nique to acquire the remaining outstanding shares of the target company. What-
ever technique is used the result sought is the same-an elimination of the minor-
ity interests. The elimination of the minority interests then allows the corporation
to return to private status."0 Under what circumstances the majority shareholders
may enact such mechanical obliterations of the minority interests is the subject of
this note's analysis.
III. Santa Fe Industries v. Green: The Necessity of a State
Remedy for Squeezed-Out Minority Shareholders
The alternative sources of regulatory power over going private transactions
are the federal securities laws, enforced by the federal courts and the SEC, and
the corporate laws of the individual states. The United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green," however, substantially limits
8 Elimination of the minority interests may be accomplished by a variety of techniques
including reverse stock splits, sale of assets and dissolution, or bankruptcy. See generally
Borden, supra note 1.
9 Generally, the state merger statutes require either a two-thirds or majority shareholder
approval to sustain a merger. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (Cumm. Supp. 1977)
(majority); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law (McKinney) § 903 (Supp. 1977-1978) (two-thirds).
Short-form merger statutes, available in most states, further simplify the squeeze-out by allow-
ing inside shareholders controlling a specific amount (generally 90%) of the outstanding
stock to effect the merger without submitting it for shareholder approval. See, e.g., Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). See also Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1299
n.1 (2nd Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), for a summary of statutory percentages of
various states.
10 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
11 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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the availability of a federal remedy for squeezed-out minority shareholderS. In
Green the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit" that had allowed an action under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for a merger eliminating the minority interest under the
Delaware short-form merger statute. Pursuant to the statutory merger procedure,
Santa Fe Industries, which had previously acquired 951% control of the target
company, obtained independent appraisals of the target's assets. The appraisals
and other financial data were submitted to a reputable investment flanking
firm for a determination of a fair offer to the minority shareholders. Santa Fe
Industries then notified the target's minority shareholders within the time allowed
by the statute and offered to pay each of them an amount 20% higher than
the independent appraisal. Santa Fe also advised the shareholders of their right
to obtain a statutory appraisal if dissatisfied with the offered price. The minority
shareholders, however, objected to the merger and alleged that it was undertaken
solely to eliminate the minority and therefore lacked any justifiable business
purpose." The Second Circuit held that fraud was inherent in the freezing out
of a minority interest in a going private transaction that lacked a valid corporate
purpose. Thus, the minority shareholders did have a cause of action under
Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. 4 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or rule lOb-5
could not be sustained on a breach of fiduciary duty alone." The Court held
that the provisions of the 1934 Act prohibiting "manipulative or deceptive"
conduct were terms of art and required either a material misrepresentatiori or a
material failure to disclose. 6 The Court pointed out that the "fundamental
purpose" of the 1934 Act is to achieve full disclosure, hence, "once full and fair
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a
tangential concern of the statute."' 7 The Court left unanswered the question
whether a merger transaction effected solely to eliminate the minority interest is
in fact a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty. Resolution of that issue was
unnecessary inasmuch as the Court held that the federal securities statutes were
12 Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2nd Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
13 At trial the minority shareholders also alleged that the stock had been fraudulently
appraised in an effort to freeze-out the minority stockholders at an inadequate price, in violation
of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed that claim
concluding that if "full and fair disclosure" is made, transactions eliminating minority interests
are beyond the purview of rule lOb-5, and since the complainants did not allege any nondis-
closure or misrepresentation they could not sustain an action on the averred basis. That
portion of the district court's holding was left undisturbed by the Second Circuit. See 430
U.S. at 462, 463.
14 533 F.2d at 1290.
15 The Court distinguished those decisions cited by the Second Circuit as standing for
the proposition that the majority stockholders' breach of fiduciary duty alone constitutes a
cause of action under SEC rule lOb-5. The Court stated that in each of the decisions cited
for that proposition by the Second 'Circuit there were elements of deceptive conduct on behalf
of the majority stockholders. 430 U.S. 475. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) ; Drachman v. Harvey, 453
F.2d 722 (2nd Cir. 1972); Pappas v. Moss, 393 1F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1968); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
16 430 U.S. at 476, 477.
17 Id. at 478.
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not designed to "regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal
corporate mismanagement."' 8 Thus, without deciding whether the majority
had breached their fiduciary obligation the Court held that the issue whether a
cause of action exists for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty, without more, was to
be relegated to state law.19
The Supreme Court's decision in Green renders unlikely any significant
amount of future litigation under the 1934 Act by dissident minority share-
holders squeezed out by a going private transaction. It will be extremely difficult
for the minority shareholders to prove a material misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure in a going private transaction, as most acquiring groups in these transactions
are careful to disclose their intent to acquire the entire equity interest of the target
company."0 The unfairness inherent in going private transactions generally is not
due to a misrepresentation or failure to disclose; rather, it results from com-
pelling a minority shareholder to liquidate his investment in a transaction
designed solely to eliminate him from participation in the company's future
growth. For that reason, these transactions are best analyzed under the law
governing corporate fiduciaries. In light of the Court's decision in Green, which
precludes a federal remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty in the absence of
material non-disclosure or material misrepresentation, the burden will be upon
the state courts to effect regulation of going private transactions.
IV. Singer v. Magnavox: A State Remedy for Squeezed-Out
Minority Shareholders
Due to the refined body of corporate case law, companies that incorporate
in Delaware are often able to predict accurately the legal effect of a certain
course of action. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., however, the Delaware Supreme
Court blurred the law in a sensitive area and thus raised questions about the
reliability of the old case law concerning mergers.
The Singer court held that a valid corporate purpose must exist in order to
uphold an otherwise statutorily valid merger. More significantly, the court held
further that even a merger with the requisite corporate purpose will be subject
to judicial scrutiny to determine the "entire fairness" of the transaction. The
Delaware court responded to the Supreme Court's admonition in Green that if
going private transactions are to be regulated, the primary responsibility would
fall to the states. An examination of the Singer decision, viewed in the context of
prior Delaware case law, is therefore important to an analysis of the future of
going private transactions. The influence of the Delaware court on the uncertain
body of law surrounding going private transactions is likely to be formidable.
A. Pre-Singer Remedy for Minority Shareholders in Delaware
In Singer, the Delaware court was faced with the same obstacle that other
state courts had confronted in responding to allegations of unfairness from share-
18 Id. at 479.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., 380 A.2d at 971.
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holders squeezed-out in going private transactions: the apparent legislative ap-
proval of mergers designed to eliminate the minority. Section 251, the general
merger statute of the General Corporation Law of Delaware, allows two Dela-
ware corporations to merge pursuant to a majority vote of the shareholders
entitled to vote.2 The statute further provides that the minority shareholders of
the merged company may be paid cash for their shares rather than stock in the
surviving corporation."
The statute does not require a legitimate corporate purpose to effect a valid
merger. The sole statutory remedy available to a dissenting shareholder is his
appraisal right-i.e., the right to request the court to determine a fair value for
his shares.2 Implicit in the merger statute is the legislature's confidence in the
fairness of the appraisal remedy. As a corollary, the statute negates any inference
of a shareholder's vested right in the form (to be distinguished from the value)
of his investment.
Similarly, section 253, the so-called "short form merger" statute, allows for
the elimination of the minority by "cash-out."2 " The short form statute is avail-
able to corporations owning 90% or more of the outstanding stock of the target
company, and allows them to accomplish the proposed merger without first
submitting the question of merger for shareholder approval. A resolution of
the board of directors is all that is necessary to effect the merger. As in section
251, the short form statute neither expressly requires a valid business purpose for
the merger nor specifies a remedy other than the dissenters' appraisal right.
Prior to the decision in Singer, the Delaware courts were reluctant to inquire
into the nature or existence of the business purpose underlying an otherwise valid
merger.2" The Delaware merger statutes were held to have "independent legal
significance." Under this interpretation of the statute, an otherwise valid merger
was not subject to collateral attack.2" Thus, action that might otherwise be
impermissible was apparently allowed if accomplished in accordance with the
merger statutes. In Federal United Corporation v. Havender" for example,
accrued dividends owed on preferred stock were successfully eliminated by means
of a merger. The use of a charter amendment, however, was held to be an im-
21 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (Cumin. Supp. 1977).
22 Id. The predecessor of section 251 did not allow shareholders of the target to be
involuntarily excluded from an equity position in the surviving corporation. As originally
enacted section 251 required that shareholders of the target company receive shares of stock
in the surviving corporation.
23 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (Cumin. Supp. 1977).
24 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (Cumi. Supp. 1977).
25 See, e.g., MacCrone v. American Capital Corporation, 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943);
Bruce v. E.L. Bruce, 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Del. Ch. 1961) (reasons for merger or
the business necessity behind the merger are not matters for judicial inquiry). See also Grimes
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D.Fla. 1974) (applying Delaware
law); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL 'CORPORATION LAv 332 (1972) (the 1967
revision of the Delaware corporation statutes "in particular reflects the continuing legislative
approval of mergers and the avoidance of their disruption by protesting stockholders"). But
see note 39 infra.
26 See 51 F. Supp. 462; Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. 'Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1963). See also text accompanying note 28 infra.
27 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In Havender the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld a merger between a parent and an existing, but inactive, subsidiary for the
purpose of eliminating accrued dividends on preferred stock.
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permissible method of eliminating the same arrearages."
Another presumed corollary to the merger law prior to the Singer decision
was that the only remedy for a shareholder who objected to a statutorily valid
merger was to be paid the fair value of his stock as determined in an appraisal
proceeding." In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court had held that "the very
purpose of the [short form merger] statute is to provide the parent corporation
with a means of eliminating the minority shareholders' interest in the enter-
prise."" That holding clearly negated'any inference that a shareholder had a
vested right in the form of his investment.
In Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court removed the underpinnings of each
of these pillars in Delaware corporate law.
B. The Singer Decision
The litigation in Singer centered on a merger in July, 1975, of the Magna-
vox Company (Magnavox) with T.M.C. Development Corporation (T.M.C.),
a wholly-owned subsidiary of North American Philips Corporation (North
American). Apparently, T.M.C.'s sole function was to assist North American
in the acquisition of Magnavox. In August, 1974, T.M.C. made a tender offer
of $8.00 per share for the Magnavox common shares. The tender offer included
a statement informing Magnavox shareholders of T.M.C.'s intention to acquire
the entire equity interest of Magnavox and advised them of the possible effects of
this action, including (1) delisting of present or future Magnavox shares by the
New York Stock Exchange, (2) creation of an unfavorable market for the
shares, (3) loss of information rights granted under rules of the Exchange and
under the federal securities law, and (4) depending on the number of shares
acquired, employment of some "mop up" device such as a merger to acquire
the remaining shares.
The directors of Magnavox opposed the offer, arguing that the offer of
$8.00 per share was grossly inadequate since the book value was in excess of
$11.00. The directors voiced their disapproval of the proposed merger in a letter
to their shareholders in August, 1974.
28 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (an elimination
of accrued dividends could not be accomplished by a charter amendment).
29 392 F. Supp. at 1403; Stauffer v. Standard Brands Incorporated, 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178
A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff'd, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Coyne v. Park
& Tilford Distillers Corporation, 37 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d 785, (Del. Ch. 1958), aff'd, 38
Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also 430 U.S. at 474 n.14 (under Delaware
law an appraisal is the sole remedy for any alleged unfairness in the terms of a merger).
30 187 A.2d at 80. The Stauffer decision concerned a section 253 short form merger. At
the time the Stauffer decision a section 251 long form merger did not provide for compen-
sating shareholders of a target corporation with cash. The Stauffer court noted that since
section 251 did not allow a "cash-out", a means of eliminating the minority shareholders could
not be held to be the purpose of the long form merger statute. Section 251 has since been
amended (1967) and allows for the "cash-out" of the target's shareholders. (See text ac-
companying note 23 supra.) In that sections 251 and 253 are now substantively the same it
can be presumed that the legislature has approved cash mergers accomplished under section
251 for the very purpose of freezing-out the minority. See David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley
Industries, Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971) (rights of minority shareholders under a
section 251 merger are no greater than those under a section 253 merger); Balotti, The
Elimination of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General
Corporation Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. OF CORP. LAw 63, 77 (1976).
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In September, 1974, the corporate management of Magnavox and North
American compromised their differences over the terms of the offer and agreed
to a price of $9.00 per share. The compromise included two-year employment
contracts for sixteen officers of Magnavox at existing salary levels. The directors
of Magnavox withdrew their opposition to the offer, whereupon T.M.C. ac-
quired approximately 84o of Magnavox's outstanding common stock. There-
after, in July, 1975, the directors of Magnavox unanimously agreed to a pro-
posed section 251 "long form" merger with T.M.C.3" In accordance with that
statute, the shareholders were given notice of a special meeting to vote on the
plan and were told that approval of the merger was assured since T.M.C.'s
holding alone was large enough to provide the requisite statutory majority. 2
The merger was accomplished, all outstanding common stock of Magnavox was
exchanged for cash, and Magnavox became part of a wholly-owned subsidiary
of North American.
The minority shareholders filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery
alleging that: (1) the merger was fraudulent because it did not serve any
business purpose other than the forced removal of public minority shareholders
from an equity position in Magnavox at a grossly inadequate price in order to
enable North American, through T.M.C., to obtain sole ownership of Magna-
vox, and (2) T.M.C., as the majority shareholder, had breached its fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders by approving the merger at a cash price per
share to the minority which it knew to be grossly inadequate.
The Chancery Court granted a motion to dismiss,3" ruling that: (1) the
merger was not fraudulent merely because it was accomplished without any
business purpose other than to eliminate the Magnavox minority shareholders,
and (2) in any event, plaintiff's remedy for dissatisfaction with the merger was to
seek an appraisal. The court admitted the inequity of the transaction and
stated: "[P]erhaps a use of the Delaware statutes should not be permitted which
would allow those with controlling interests who originally sought public par-
ticipation to later kick out public investors for the sole reason that they have
outlived their utility to those in control. . . ."" Nonetheless, the court held that
the mechanically flawless tender offer and merger transaction were, under the
present status of the law, entirely permissible even though the sole purpose of the
actions was to eliminate the minority shareholders.
In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court's principal consideration was the
obligation owed by majority shareholders in control of the corporate process to
minority shareholders in a merger under section 251. The court first denied
that the merger statutes had independent legal significance, holding that even
complete compliance with the statute did not insulate the merger from judicial
31 Four of the nine Magnavox directors were also directors of North American, and three
others had employment contracts (referred to above) with the surviving corporation and an
option to purchase five thousand of North American's common shares, effective on the date
of the merger.
32 The proxy statement accompanying the notice informed the Magnavox shareholders
that the book value of their stock was $10.16. The proxy statement also alerted the Magnavox
shareholders of their right to an appraisal under section 262.
33 Singer v. Magnavox Company, 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976).
34 Id. at 1358.
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review. Citing its decision in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 the court stated that the issue
was not to be decided solely upon technical grounds, but rather upon broad con-
siderations of corporate duty and loyalty. The court then focused its analysis on
the restraint that the duty to minority shareholders placed on a corporation's
statutory right to effect a merger. The Singer court quoted from its opinion in
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,3' which stated that the dominant corporation,
as a majority shareholder standing on both sides of a merger transaction, has "the
burden of establishing its entire fairness" to the minority stockholders in order
to "pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.""7 As support for this proposi-
tion the court cited its prior decisions holding that controlling shareholders owe
their corporation and its minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation of good
faith and fairness.
The essence of the Singer decision, however, is not that the majority owes
the minority a fiduciary duty. Rather, of concern to the corporate community
after the Singer decision is that conformity with the merger statute will no longer
assure that the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty is fulfilled. In analyzing the
fiduciary standard, the court indicated that a corporate purpose, or lack thereof,
is relevant to a determination of good faith."8 Further, the court intimated that
the fairness of the transaction is tied to the shareholder's vested right in the form
of his investment. Either of these propositions indicates a departure from prior
decisions interpreting Delaware law.
C. The Necessity of a Valid Corporate Purpose and the
Role of the Appraisal Remedy
The Singer court avoided direct confrontation with the definitional question
of what constitutes a valid corporate purpose. Instead, it merely alluded to two
recent unpublished opinions of the Delaware Chancery Court that suggested
the necessity of showing such a purpose to sustain the validity of a section 251
merger. 9 Thus, without addressing the definitional difficulties of the "corporate
35 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
36 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
37 380 A.2d at 976.
38 See text accompanying note 40 infra.
39 Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., Del. Oh. C.A. 4945 (December 23,
1975), reprinted in 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 444 (1976), aff'd, 379 A.2d 1121 (1977), an un-
published opinion of the Delaware Chancery Court, intimated the necessity of a valid cor-
porate purpose in a section 251 merger. In Tanzer the court stated:
The question presented is whether the merger should be enjoined because the purpose
is to serve the interest of the parent. It should be noted in this regard that [the
parent] has a legitimate and present and compelling business reason to be the sole
owner of [the subsidiary-target]. [The parent] is not freezing out the minority just for
the purpose of freezing out the minority.
I DEL. J. CoRP. L. 444, 445. The Tanzer court allowed the merger to be carried out noting
that the merger was necessary to facilitate the long-term debt financing of the parent. The
Tanzer decision was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court after its decision in Singer.
See text accompanying note 50 infra.
In Pennsylvania Mutual Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter International, Inc., Del. Ch. C.A. 4845
(August 5, 1975) reprinted in 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229 (1976), an unpublished opinion of the
Delaware Chancery Court, an order was granted temporarily restraining the accomplishment
of a merger which the plaintiff alleged constituted an unlawful freeze-out of its interest as a
stockholder. The Chancellor stated:
I have some doubt as to whether or not the merger under attack has a valid busi-
'NOTES
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purpose" requirement, the Singer court held that whatever the proper criteria
might be for determining the validity of a corporate purpose, at the least the sole
purpose must not be a "freeze-out" of the minority shareholders. The Singer
court agreed with the Chancery Court that an act so motivated would not be
fraudulent because it was accomplished without any purpose other than elimina-
tion of the minority stockholders, rather such an act would violate the fiduciary
duty owed by the majority to the minority shareholders."
To the extent that the Singer decision mandates inquiry into the business
purpose of a merger, it creates new Delaware law. Previous Delaware decisions
had held that "the reasons for a merger or the business necessity behind it are
not matters for judicial determination."'" Further, the policy of the Delaware
courts was to permit corporations to take advantage of statutory devices for
corporate consolidation and mergers in the absence of a showing of fraud or
gross unfairness as to the terms of the transaction.42 Judicial interference was
considered inappropriate in most instances of merger because an efficient and fair
method was provided through the appraisal remedy to protect those shareholders
dissatisfied with the terms of the offer.43 The Singer decision, however, overrules
such precedent and mandates an inquiry into the corporate purpose underlying
such mergers.
A necessary corollary to the Singer decision is that the shareholder's right
in his investment is not limited to its value, but also extends to its form. Hence,
a shareholder can neither be forced to accept cash for his investment nor be
compelled to exercise his appraisal right. Relating the minority shareholders'
rights to the majority's fiduciary duty, the Singer court held: "In our view, de-
fendants cannot meet their fiduciary obligations to the plaintiffs simply by rele-
gating them to a statutory appraisal proceeding."4 4 The court thus departed
ness purpose . .. there is some possibility on further argument and development of
the case of a showing of illegality of this plan by reason of its being a possible
manipulation of corporate control for private purposes with no proper business
purpose in mind.
1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 230.
The Chancery Court in Singer rejected the Todhunter decision as requiring an inquiry
into the purpose of a merger, stating that three factors mitigated against relying on the
decision for that proposition:
First, the matter arose upon the eve of a stockholder's meeting and the exigencies
of the situation prevented an in-depth examination of the problem by the court and
counsel alike. I think the Chancellor's language fairly indicates that there were
other matters to consider. This never occurred because the case was apparently
resolved by the parties without further participation by the court. No doubt this
had something to do with the fact that the decision was not reported.
367 A.2d at 1357.
Perhaps the best explanation of the Tanzer and Todhunter decisions is that they merely
raised the question whether an inquiry into the purpose of a merger was justified. See Balotti,
supra note 31, at 77. The "valid business purpose" issue was treated as one of first impres-
sion by the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer. 380 A.2d at 976.
40 380 A.2d at 980.
41 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
42 See 174 A.2d at 30 (citations).
43 Id. See also 367 A.2d at 1355.
44 380 A.2d at 977. With that statement, the Singer court was essentially distinguishing
between the right to take and the power to take. The court cited an unpublished decision of
the California Superior Court for the minorities' non-monetary interest in its investments.
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, C.A. 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975). The Jutkowitz decision
indicated that although money might satisfy some shareholders, others may have different
investment goals, tax problems, and a belief in the ability of management to make them rich.
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from the tone of previous Delaware decisions that had indicated the exclusive-
ness of the appraisal right as a remedy to a shareholder dissatisfied with an
otherwise statutorily valid merger,"
In Stauffer v. Standard Brands Incorporated,4 6 the Delaware Supreme
Court approved of the Chancery Court's statement that "[i]f a stockholder is
dissatisfied with the value placed upon his shares he may, failing an agreement
upon value, proceed to an appraisal. The dissenting stockholder is thus provided
with an adequate and complete remedy. That it is also ... an exclusive remedy
is evident.. . ." The Stauffer decision illustrates the apparent perception of the
Delaware courts, prior to Singer, of the appraisal right as the sole vehicle for
determining fair compensation to shareholders removed from equity participation
in a statutorily valid merger. The right to be paid the fair value of his shares in
such transactions was thought to be the only right the shareholder had in his
investment. The merger statutes, which provide shareholder compensation with
cash rather than securities of the surviving corporation, further foster this percep-
tion. The Singer court, however, apparently viewed the appraisal remedy as
exclusive only when the merger transaction is "entirely fair," notwithstanding
complete statutory compliance. Although the standard to be used for determining
the "entire fairness" of the transaction was not defined, the Singer court held, in
part, that even if a court finds the requisite corporate purpose, the fiduciary
obligation is not necessarily discharged.4" Every aspect of the transaction is to be
scrutinized for its "entire fairness" to the eliminated shareholders.49
V. Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.: The Delaware Supreme
Court Mollifies the Effect of the Singer Decision?
The Singer court did not define the nature of the corporate purpose neces-
sary to sustain an inquiry into the validity of a merger which results in the
elimination of the minority interests. The Delaware court's subsequent decision
in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.5" necessitated a decision
on that issue. In Tanzer, the squeezed-out minority shareholders alleged that the
In recognizing this expanded perception of a shareholder's right in his investment the Singer
court struck a balance between the prior common law right of a single minority shareholder to
veto a merger and the present statutory power of the majority under section 251. The
compromise thus struck neither allows the minority to thwart a merger without cause, nor
permits the majority to cash out the minority without a valid corporate purpose. See also
Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1964).
45 See note 30 supra.
46 187 A.2d 78 (1962).
47 178 A.2d at 314.
48 380 A.2d at 980.
49 Id. The Singer court leaves open the possibility that proof of a proper business purpose
might insulate the merger from scrutiny under the stricter "entire fairness" standard. The
court simply stated that proof of such purpose, without more, will not necessarily discharge the
fiduciary obligation of the majority. In requiring that the sole purpose of the merger be found
not to be the elimination of the minority, rather than stating its holding in terms of an affirma-
tive obligation upon the majority to show valid business purpose, the Singer court effectively
leaves the burden of persuasion on the eliminated minority shareholders to show the lack of
a valid business purpose.
50 379 A.2d 1121 (1977), rev'g, No. 4945 (Del. Ch., Dec. 23, 1975), reprinted in 1
DEL. J. CORP. L. 444 (1976).
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majority shareholders had violated their fiduciary obligation because the sole
purpose of the merger was to serve the interest of the parent. The Tanzer con-
troversy involved the merger of a subsidiary into its parent and the subsequent
elimination of the minority interests, facilitating the parent's long-term debt
financing. Without discussing the adequacy of that particular purpose, the court
emphasized the trial court's finding that the sole purpose of the merger was not
the elimination of the minority interests. By comparison, the trial court's finding
in Singer was that the sole purpose of the transaction was the elimination of the
minority interests." In rejecting the minorities' contention that the majority
shareholders had breached their fiduciary obligation, the Tanzer court held that a
merger made primarily to advance the business purpose of the majority stock-
holder is not a violation of the fiduciary relationship espoused in Singer." The
Tanzer decision thus ends the uncertainty created by the Singer decision whether
it is the target corporation or the acquiring corporation that must benefit from
the alleged corporate purpose supporting the merger. Although the Tanzer
court allows the corporate purpose to benefit the acquiring corporation alone, its
holding is not inconsistent with the implicit rationale supporting the Singer
court's decision. That rationale is apparently the same rationale underlying the
original merger statutes, i.e., it is economically beneficial to promote combina-
tions of corporations if such combinations are financially beneficial to the result-
ing entity and the business community as a whole.
Hence, when a benefit to either corporation is alleged in support of the
combination, such a merger, if otherwise fair, should not be enjoined. Only
where the sole purpose is an elimination of the minority interests will the transac-
tion be held violative.
Still unsupplied by the Delaware court are the criteria for determining the
legitimacy of an additionally averred purpose, i.e., the purpose alleged to avoid
the conclusion that the sole purpose is to eliminate the minority. It would be
consistent with the implied rationale of the Singer and Tanzer decisions for a
relatively liberal view of an alleged corporate purpose to be adopted by the
Delaware court. Since the corporate purpose test is to establish the good faith
component of the fiduciary obligation, any plausible business purpose beyond the
majority's desire to enlarge their own stockholdings should sustain judicial
scrutiny. A factor that is likely to be considered in the determination of business
purpose is the structure of the constituent companies prior to the transaction.
It would appear less difficult for corporations in an operating parent-operating
subsidiary relationship to legitimize a purpose for taking the subsidiary private
51 380 A.2d at 972.
52 379 A.2d at 1124. The Tanzer court found the "business purpose" test ambiguous and
thus focused 'instead upon the rights and powers of the majority not only as a director but
as a stockholder. The court cited other decisions in which it held that the majority stock-
holder has a fundamental right to vote its shares in its own interest. E.g., Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Com. Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947). The Tanzer court then
held that the majority may exercise its right to vote its shares in its own interest while ful-
filling its fiduciary obligation as a majority shareholder and director if its purpose in causing
the merger was bona fide. See 379 A.2d at 1124. The purpose must not be suspect as a sub-
terfuge, the real purpose of the merger being to rid the majority of unwanted minority share-
holders in the subsidiary. Id. And, in any event, a bona fide purpose notwithstanding, the




as there are many economies to be achieved in the combination of parent and
subsidiary, particularly where both corporations are in the same or related
business. Less certain to withstand an inquiry into legitimacy of corporate pur-
pose is a transaction involving two previously unrelated corporations. Typically,
as in Singer, the previously unrelated acquiring corporation will follow a tender
offer with a squeeze-out merger to acquire the entire control of the corporate
enterprise. In those situations, the length of time that the parent holds a con-
trolling majority of the subsidiary before eliminating the minority may be a
factor. A longer holding period, although not necessary to find a valid corporate
purpose, might negate any inference that the acquiring corporation's sole objec-
tive for merging was to eliminate the minority shareholders. Any indicia im-
plying a purpose other than a mere desire to consolidate control among the
majority will be an aid to the acquiring company. In any event, those benefits
inherent in eliminating the minority, such as the savings of cost in servicing
shareholders, should not alone be a sufficient purpose to legitimize the transac-
tion.
VI. Conclusion
All the implications of the Singer decision are not entirely clear."s In any
event, the decision contributes significantly to the law governing going private
transactions. The essence of the Singer decision is the Delaware Supreme Court's
view that the fiduciary obligation of the majority shareholders in a going private
transaction involves two implied components. The first component is good faith,
determined with a view toward the existence and nature of a corporate purpose.
The second is fairness. Although the court left the latter component rather ill-
defined, it intimated that every aspect of the transaction will be scrutinized for its
entire fairness to the eliminated shareholders. Such an inquiry into the fairness
extends beyond the adequacy of the appraisal remedy."
The Delaware court's bifurcated approach to the fiduciary duty concept
provides a workable framework for analysis of transactions designed to eliminate a
minority interest. Courts adopting the Delaware approach will, in addition to
53 Shortly after the Singer decision the Delaware Supreme Court applied the "entire
fairness" standard of Singer in a tender offer case. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d
278 (Del. 1978). Together, the Singer, Tanzer, and Vickers decisions demonstrate the Dela-
ware court's response to the increasing pressure in recent years for a federal fiduciary standard.
Delaware would undoubtedly like to prevent federal standards for corporate conduct which
could be imposed through either federal chartering of corporations or through added federal
securities regulations. See SEC, Going Private Transactions by Public Companies of Their
Auxiliaries, 42 FED. REG. 60,090, 60,092 n.24 (1977) (to be codified in 17 CFR, Part 290).
54 One commentator has suggested that one condition of "entire fairness" will be whether
the dominant shareholder is using its own funds for the acquisition of total control or whether
it is using its control of the corporation to obtain funds to finance the acquisition. Herrmann,
Changes in the Merger Provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law Since 1967, 3
DEL. J. CORP. L. 307, 311 (1978). There are Delaware decisions which might support this
proposition. See, e.g., Bennet v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Petty
v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975). But cf. 'Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (use of corporate funds to purchase treasury stock
to resist takeover by outsiders held proper because motivated by business judgment that the




requiring statutory compliance, view such transactions with two questions in
mind:
(1) Is there a legitimate corporate purpose in effecting the transaction,
other than a desire to accrue the inherent benefits of concentrating
ownership among the majority shareholders? 55
(2) Is every aspect of the transaction "entirely fair" to the eliminated
minority shareholders?
A negative response to either of these questions is a breach of the majority's
fiduciary duty to the minority.
Undoubtedly some courts will conclude that Singer provides for an unwar-
ranted judicial intrusion into corporate management. Nevertheless, the ostensible
result of the Singer decision is to bring the law governing corporate mergers
nearly full-circle. The old common law requirement of unanimity did not allow
corporate mergers without the approval of every shareholder. Statutory mod-
ifications subsequently allowed such transactions with a simple majority ap-
proval. The Singer decision mitigates the effect of those statutory modifications
by subjecting every statutorily valid merger to judicial scrutiny as to its good
faith and fairness to all shareholders.
The Singer decision presents obstacles to those corporations going private.
Those obstacles will make it costly and difficult to effect the desired result in
many situations. Not only must the corporations have sound business reasons for
future "freeze-outs," but they must also insure that every aspect of the transac-
tion is fair to the eliminated minority.
Finally, Singer raises the question whether the Delaware Supreme Court
has veered off on a reformist course. Perhaps the court was responding to recent
criticism of Delaware corporate law,56 or reacting to increasing pressure for some
form of federal intervention into corporate matters." In any event, it is doubtful
that the court will jeopardize the prominence of Delaware in the corporate com-
munity by stricter inquiry into traditional management prerogatives. If the court
continues on the path of such strict inquiry, the Delaware legislature may
reverse the Singer decision. As one commentator has stated: "There is much to
be said for painless tax revenues, and something to be said too for a grand old
tradition that has made the Delaware corporation as familiar a phrase in the
American lexicon as the Manhattan skyscraper and the Philadelphia lawyer."5 "
-James P. Kelley
55 The Tanzer decision allows this purpose to be solely that of the acquiring corporation.
See text accompanying note 52 supra.
56 See Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW.
1101 (1974).
57 See note 53 supra.
58 Smith, Delaware Works Hard to Stay a Corporate Home Sweet Home, FORTUNE,
Feb. 13, 1978, at 134.
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